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7. Institutions, paradigms, and tax
evasion in developing and transition
countries
James Aim and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez*
INTRODUCTION
Although it is commonly said that the only things certain in life are death and
taxes, it is unmistakable that taxes are in fact far from inevitable. Individuals
do not like paying taxes, they take a variety of actions to reduce their tax
liabilities, and in many occasions they get away with it. Some of these
actions can be classified as tax avoidance, or the legal reduction in tax
liabilities by practices that take full advantage of the tax code, such as income
splitting, postponement of taxes, and tax arbitrage across income sources that
face different treatment. Tax evasion consists of illegal and intentional
actions taken by individuals and firms to reduce their legally due tax
obligations, by underreporting incomes, sales or wealth, by overstating
deductions, exemptions or credits, or by failing to file appropriate tax returns.
For its part, government must take actions to increase compliance with the
tax laws.
Tax evasion is notoriously difficult to measure.' Still, there is widespread
evidence that tax evasion is extensive and commonplace in nearly all
countries. For the United States, the most reliable estimates suggest that the
amount of unpaid federal individual and corporate income taxes totaled $127
billion for 1992, with an annual growth rate of 10 percent since 1973
(Internal Revenue Service, 19%). Evidence from a variety of methods for
other and diverse countries, such as Argentina (Herschel, 1978), the
Philippines (Manasan, 1988), Jamaica (Aim, Bahl and Murray, 1990; 1993),
the Netherlands (Elffers, 1991), and Spain (de Juan et al., 1994), indicate that
tax evasion is a pervasive and extensive phenomenon.
Tax evasion is important for many reasons. The most obvious is that its
presence reduces tax collections, thereby affecting taxes that compliant
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taxpayers face and public services that citizens receive. Evasion creates
misallocations in resource use when individuals alter their behavior to lower
their taxes, such as in their choices of hours to work, occupations to enter,
and investments to undertake. Its presence requires that government expend
resources to deter non-compliance, to detect its magnitude, and to penalize its
practitioners.
Non-compliance alters the distribution of income in
unpredictable ways. Evasion may contribute to feelings of unfair treatment
and disrespect for the law. It affects the accuracy of macroeconomic
statistics. More broadly, it is not possible to understand the true impact of
taxation without recognizing the existence of tax evasion and the economic
incidence of tax evasion (Martinez-Vazquez, 1996).
In developing and transition countries (DTCs) in particular, tax evasion is
often widespread and, indeed, systemic.2 Thus, the problem of tax evasion
tends to have far more serious consequences in DTCs than in developed
economies.
In this chapter we examine what we have learned from the analyses of tax
evasion, which for the most part have occurred in the context of developed
countries, and what we can apply from these lessons to the problem of tax
evasion in DTCs. Specifically, we examine several key issues. First, we
present the basic analytical framework of the individual evasion decision, in
order to study the major factors that economic theory suggests motivate
individuals to evade — or to pay - their taxes. We argue that this basic
framework offers some important insights but also suffers from some
significant limitations, limitations that arise largely because of its failure to
incorporate fully or realistically the role of societal institutions in the
analytical framework. Second, then, we examine these institutions, and we
argue that the existence of a 'social norm' of compliance and the presence of
an effective but service-oriented tax administration are crucial, broadly
defined societal institutions that influence the magnitude of tax evasion.
Indeed, these institutions are closely linked, and jointly determine the extent
of tax evasion. Such institutional factors are obviously important in all
countries but are especially decisive in DTCs, and, because these institutions
are typically so inadequate in such countries, tax evasion is typically so
extensive there. Third, we demonstrate the importance of such institutions in
DTCs with three case studies: in Jamaica, to demonstrate the important but
limited role in developing countries of basic enforcement strategies like
higher audit probabilities and penalty rates; in Africa, to demonstrate the
crucial role of social norms in compliance decisions; and in Russia, to
demonstrate the limited effect of administrative innovations like tax
amnesties in a country that lacks both an effective tax administration and a
social norm of compliance. We conclude with a discussion on how to
improve tax compliance in DTCs.
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMPLIANCE
DECISION
The standard economic approach to the analysis of tax compliance has relied
upon the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968) and
first applied to tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this
section we first review the basic model of individual compliance behavior.
There have been numerous extensions to the basic model, and we briefly
discuss these extensions. This overall literature is then assessed.1
Consider the standard model of tax evasion. In its simplest form, an
individual is assumed to receive a fixed amount of income /, and must choose
how much of this income to declare to the tax authorities and how much to
under-report. The individual pays taxes at rate t on every dollar D of income
that is declared, while no taxes are paid on under-reported income. However,
the individual may be audited with a fixed, random probability p; if audited,
then all under-reported income is discovered, and the individual must pay a
penalty at rate/on each dollar that he or she was supposed to pay in taxes but
did not pay. The individual's income Ic if caught under-reporting, equals
Ic=I-tD-f[t(I-D)],

(7.1)

while if under-reporting is not caught, income 1N is
IN=I~tD.

(7.2)

The individual chooses declared income to maximize the expected utility of
the evasion gamble, or
E U(I)=pU(Ic)+(l-p)U(IN).

(7.3)

where E is the expectation operator and utility U(I) is a function only of
income. This optimization generates a standard first-order condition for an
interior solution; given concavity of the utility function, the second-order
condition will be satisfied.4'5
Comparative statics results are easily derived. It is straightforward to
show that an increase in the probability of detection p and the penalty rate /
unambiguously increase declared income.6 An increase in income has an
ambiguous effect on declared income, an effect that depends upon the
individual's attitude toward risk.7 Surprisingly, an increase in the tax rate t
has an ambiguous effect on declared income. A higher tax rate increases the
return to cheating, which reduces the amount of declared income. However,
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a higher tax rate also reduces income; if, as is usually assumed, the individual
exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the lower income makes the
evasion gamble less attractive and declared income increases accordingly
(Yitzhaki, 1974).
This economics-of-crime approach gives the sensible result that
compliance depends upon enforcement. However, it is essential to recognize
that this approach also concludes that an individual pays taxes because - and
only because - of the economic consequences of detection and punishment.8
Again, this is a plausible and productive insight, with the obvious implication
that the government can encourage greater tax compliance by increasing the
audit and the penalty rates. The many extensions of this economics-of-crime
approach considerably complicate the theoretical analyses, and generally
render clear-cut analytical results impossible.9 Nevertheless, they retain the
basic approach and the basic result: individuals focus exclusively on the
financial incentives of the evasion gamble, and individuals pay taxes solely
because they fear detection and punishment.10
However, it is clear to many observers that compliance cannot be
explained entirely by such financial considerations, especially those
generated by the level of enforcement (Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Smith and
Kinsey, 1987; Elffers, 1991). For example, the percentage of individual
income tax returns that are subject to a thorough tax audit is generally quite
small in most countries, often less than 1 percent of all returns. Similarly, the
penalty on even fraudulent evasion seldom exceeds more than the amount of
unpaid taxes, and these penalties are infrequently imposed; civil penalties on
non-fraudulent evasion are even smaller. A purely economic analysis of the
evasion gamble suggests that most rational individuals should either underreport income not subject to source withholding or overclaim deductions not
subject to independent verification because it is extremely unlikely that such
cheating will be caught and penalized. However, even in the least compliant
countries evasion never rises to levels predicted by a purely economic
analysis, and in fact there are often substantial numbers of individuals who
apparently pay all of their taxes regardless of the financial incentives they
face from the enforcement regime"'12
The basic model of individual compliance behavior therefore implies that
rational individuals should report virtually no income. Although compliance
varies significantly across countries and across taxes, and is often quite low,
compliance seldom falls to a level predicted by the standard economic theory
of compliance, even in DTCs. It seems implausible that government
enforcement activities alone can account for these levels of compliance; the
basic model, in its reliance on expected utility theory, is certainly unable to
explain this behavior. Indeed, the puzzle of tax compliance behavior is why
people pay taxes, not why they evade them (Aim et al., 1992). This
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observation suggests that the compliance decision must be affected in ways
not captured by the basic economics-of-crime approach.
In short, the limited ability to incorporate many relevant factors or to
incorporate them in a meaningful way has meant that the standard theoretical
analysis of the compliance decision is largely unable to explain the level of
tax reporting, even when it has more success in explaining the change in
reporting in response to policy innovations. In particular, these models
generally imply that rational individuals should pay far less in taxes than they
actually do. This is not a mere quibble. It goes to the heart of the basic
model, as well as its many extensions, for explaining compliance.
Consequently, most of the theoretical analyses that economists have produced
in the context of developed economies give limited help in understanding the
problem of tax evasion in DTCs. As we argue next, we believe that a
meaningful study of tax compliance requires recognition of the important,
perhaps decisive, role of societal institutions in the tax compliance decision.

THE ROLE OF SOCIETAL INSTITUTIONS
Social Norms
A first institution is what might be termed the 'social norm' of compliance.
Although difficult to define precisely, a social norm can be distinguished by
the feature that it is process-oriented, unlike the outcome-orientation of
individual rationality (Elster, 1989). A social norm therefore represents a
pattern of behavior that is judged in a similar way by others and that therefore
is sustained in part by social approval or disapproval. Consequently, if others
behave according to some socially accepted mode of behavior, then the
individual will behave appropriately; if others do not so behave, then the
individual will respond in kind."
The existence of a social norm suggests that an individual will comply as
long as he or she believes that compliance is the social norm. Conversely, if
non-compliance becomes pervasive, then the social norm of compliance
disappears.14 It is also likely, though not without controversy, that the social
norm of compliance differs significantly across countries. Some evidence to
support this variation in social norms is discussed in more detail later.
This perspective also suggests that, if government can affect the social
norm of compliance, then such government policies represent another,
potentially significant tool in the government's battle with tax evaders. Of
course, policies to change the social norm of compliance are difficult to
determine in theory. However, there is some evidence from various social
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sciences that suggests that these norms can be affected by government
institutions and policies.
The role of process in individual and group decisions is becoming
increasingly recognized. For example, there is much behavioral science
evidence that implies that greater individual participation in the decision
process will foster an increased level of compliance, in part because
participation implies some commitment to the institution and such
commitment in turn requires behavior that is consistent with words and
actions. This notion implies that one dimension by which social norms can
be affected is via individual participation in the decision process, say, by
voting. Also, survey evidence suggests that compliance is higher when
taxpayers feel that they have a voice in the way their taxes will be spent. *
Under such circumstances, they are likely to feel more inclined to pay their taxes.
Another dimension by which social norms may be affected by government
actions is related to the level of popular support for the government program.
Widespread support tends to legitimize the public sector, and so imposes
some social norm to pay taxes. Consequently, it seems likely that there will
be more tax compliance when the public good provided to a community is
popular. Survey evidence is largely consistent with this hypothesis.
Still another dimension by which social norms can be changed is the
government's commitment to enforcing the tax laws.
In fact, as we
emphasize later, it seems likely that there is a constant interaction between
social norms and tax administration. If the perception becomes widespread
that the government is not willing to detect and penalize evaders, then such a
perception legitimizes tax evasion. The rejection of sanctions sends a signal
to each individual that others do not wish to enforce the tax laws and that tax
evasion is in some sense socially acceptable, and the social norm of
compliance disappears. Such an outcome is common in many countries, such
as the Philippines and Italy where it seems to be accepted that tax evasion is
the norm. The introduction of a tax amnesty may also affect the social norm
of compliance. A tax amnesty gives individuals an opportunity to pay
previously unpaid back-taxes without being subject to the penalties that the
discovery of evasion normally brings.
Such amnesties may reduce
compliance if honest taxpayers resent tlje tax forgiveness given to tax cheats
(and if individuals believe that the amnesty may be repeated again). The role
of tax amnesties is discussed in more detail later.
In their entirety, the various influences of the social norm of compliance
can be classified into two basic categories. The first relates to how the
taxpayer judges his or her own compliance behavior in light of the
individual's own feelings about what is proper, acceptable, or moral
behavior, what might be termed 'internal norms'. The second relates to
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whether other taxpayers are perceived as paying their fair burden of taxes and
to how the taxpayer feels he or she is treated by government in such areas as
the payment of taxes, the receipt of government services, or the
responsiveness of government decisions (or 'external norms').
We believe that there is considerable intuitive appeal to the potential
importance of social norms in tax compliance behavior. There is strong
evidence that many countries with roughly the same fiscal system exhibit far
different patterns of compliance. There is also much survey evidence from
many countries that indicates that compliance is strongly affected by the
strength and commitment to the social norm of compliance.15 These surveys
conclude, among other things, that those who comply view tax evasion as
'immoral', that compliance is higher if a 'moral appeal' to the taxpayer is
made by the government, that the low social standing of tax evaders can be
an effective deterrent, that individuals with tax evaders as friends are more
likely to be evaders themselves, and that compliance is greater in
communities with a stronger sense of social cohesion. Other survey evidence
suggests that some people will not pay their taxes if they dislike the way their
taxes are spent, if they feel they have no say in the decision process, if they
feel that the government is unresponsive to their wishes, or if they feel that
they are treated unfairly by the government. There is also some empirical,
experimental and simulation evidence that compliance is affected by the
nature of the collective decision process, at least in democratic countries
(Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1989; Aim, Jackson and McKee, 1993;
Pommerehne et at., 1994). It may well be that such sentiments play an
important, perhaps a dominant, role in tax compliance.
However, there is not full agreement on this issue. Tanzi and Pellechio
(1995) argue that the role of social norms in overall compliance is often
exaggerated. In their view, given the right incentives and institutions,
taxpayers would tend to behave the same, regardless of where they reside.
To support their argument, they cite a number of countries (for example,
Chile, Peru, Mexico, Uganda, Ghana) where overhauls of tax administrations
produced significant increases in revenue collections. However, it is not
clear that these improved performances have been sustainable (for example,
Mexico's revenues eventually decreased) without a deeper transformation of
the fiscal exchange between governments and taxpayers (for example, this
may have been the case in Chile). At any rate, in our view the hypothesized
impact of social norms on tax compliance does not contradict but rather has a
symbiotic relationship with the strengthening and effectiveness of tax
administration institutions in a country.
To illustrate the ways in which a social norm might alter the analysis of
the compliance decision, consider a slight modification of the earlier
compliance model.16 As before, an individual member, now denoted
of a
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larger group is assumed to receive a fixed amount of income, and must
choose the amount to declare to the tax authorities. The individual pays taxes
on each dollar of declared income. Undeclared income is not taxed, but the
individual may be audited with some random probability, at which point a
fine is imposed on each dollar of unpaid taxes. Now, however, assume also
that the total taxes paid by all individuals in the group are summed, increased
by a multiplier m that may be greater than or less than one, and divided in
equal shares s among all members of the group; a multiplier greater than one
reflects the positive consumers' surplus associated with government
provision of a public good, while a multiplier less than one implies potential
misuse or waste in government provision.
To simplify the analysis, assume that the individual chooses declared
income to maximize the expected value of the evasion gamble, an approach
that is implied by expected utility maximization when the individual is riskneutral. Note that the assumption of risk-neutrality is not essential for our
analysis, but serves mainly to simplify the derivation of our results.
The expected value EV, to individual i from the choice of declared income
is
EV, =/,- tD, + mst(£. Dj) - pfi(I, - D).

(7.4)

Maximization of EV, by the choice of declared income D, indicates that
individual i will optimally report all income if
pf + ms > /,

(7.5)

while the individual will report zero income if the inequality is reversed. The
individual's decision here is therefore all-or-none: the individual reports
either all income or zero income. The presence of risk-aversion modifies the
all-or-none nature of individual behavior, without changing the basic
comparative statics results.
There are several ways in which the role of social norms can be introduced
in the model of self-interested individual behavior. Perhaps the simplest way
is suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who incorporate what they
term a 'reference point' as a form of social norm in prospect theory. They
assume that a loss in utility occurs if individuals do not achieve some
reference point, a phenomenon they call 'loss aversion'. The social norm
may be achieved by reporting all income and paying all taxes; individuals
who declare less than their full income and pay less than their full taxes suffer
a loss in utility.
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More formally, assume that each individual i now maximizes E V f ,
defined as
EV * = /, - ID, + mst(£. Dj)-pft(U - Dj) - y, t( / r ~DJ
=

EV, —

Yi

t(I[-Di),

(7.6)

where EV, is defined by equation (7.4). The individual now is assumed to
suffer a psychological loss in expected income proportional to undisclosed
taxes, and the coefficient y, measures as a fraction of income how much
individual / would pay to avoid the loss associated with each dollar of
unreported taxes. Condition (7.5) for compliance now becomes modified to
pf+ ms> 1 - y,

(7.7)

which still allows for the deterrent effect of audits and fines but which is
more easily satisfied than condition (7.5) (and is more easily satisfied the
larger is y,). Clearly, yt is likely to be sensitive to the social norm of tax
compliance. The stronger is the social norm, the more deviant the behavior
of a non-compliant individual becomes, and the more loss the individual
feels. Also, y, is likely to be affected by the nature of the fiscal exchange.
In summary, the investigation of the impact of social norms on compliance
behavior is a promising avenue of research for understanding tax evasion in
DTCs. To the extent that these norms are influenced by the responsiveness of
government to its citizens' needs and the effectiveness of government
institutions, including the tax administration, the scope of government
policies to combat tax evasion is significantly broader than that implied by
the standard economic approach. It should not come as a surprise to many
government officials in DTCs that controlling tax evasion will require
improving overall governance and delivering value for money to taxpayercitizens.
Tax Administration
A second institution is the administrative machinery of the government tax
agency. The administrative dimension of taxation has long been recognized
by tax administrators and practitioners in a long list of country studies, and it
has frequently been flagged by economists working on tax policy in
developing countries (Goode, 1981; Bird, 1989; Das-Gupta and Mukhajee,
1997). A 'tax administration' exists to ensure compliance with the tax laws,
and much of the discussion of tax administration is consistent with the
economics-of-crime approach discussed earlier. However, as emphasized by

Institutions, paradigms and tax evasion in developing countries

155

Bagchi et al. (1995), it is helpful to view the tax administration process
somewhat more broadly, as a production function in which 'inputs' like
personnel, materials, information, laws and procedures are used to produce
several 'outputs', the most important of which is government revenue, but
which also includes taxpayer satisfaction, equity and social welfare.
With these goals in mind, tax administration reform in DTCs emphasizes a
variety of measures, including such traditional policies as:
•

•
•
•
•

Introducing an effective audit program that identifies individuals who
do not file tax returns as well as those who under-report income or
overclaim deductions and credits
Applying non-harsh penalties often and consistently
Using source-withholding whenever possible
Facilitating payments through the banking system
Making use of third-party sources of information to verify reporting
behavior

These inputs view the taxpayer as a potential criminal who must be deterred
from cheating.
However, it is increasingly the case that inputs are not limited to these
traditional enforcement mechanisms. Instead, tax administrations in many
developing countries are also introducing policies that emphasize the
provision of taxpayer services via such things as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Promoting taxpayer education and developing taxpayer services to
assist taxpayers at every step in filing returns and paying taxes
Broadcasting advertisements that link taxes with government services
Simplifying taxes and the payment of taxes
Promoting voluntary compliance by lowering the costs for taxpayers
associated with filing their taxes
Ensuring relative stability of the tax system
Adopting the general principle of self-assessment
Promoting a taxpayer - and a tax administrator - 'code of ethics'.

Put differently, the taxpayer is no longer seen simply as a potential criminal
but as a potential client. This new approach suggests a different paradigm for
tax compliance than one that emerges ffom traditional analysis.
These
alternative paradigms are discussed next.
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Two Paradigms
Our discussion of social norms and tax administration suggests that two very
different paradigms can be followed in encouraging tax compliance, each
with very different implications for tax compliance behavior. Under the first
paradigm, taxpayers are viewed and treated as potential criminals, and the
emphasis is exclusively on repression of illegal behavior through frequent
audits and stiff penalties. This has been the conventional paradigm of tax
administrations through history, and it fits well the standard economic model
of tax evasion based on the economic theory of crime. A second paradigm
recognizes the role of enforcement, but also emphasizes the role of tax
administration as a facilitator and a provider of services to taxpayer-citizens.
This new paradigm for tax administration fits squarely with the perspective
that emphasizes the role of social norms in tax compliance; that is, the
government can change tax compliance by changing the social norm of tax
compliance.17
In fact, the most recent literature on tax administration reform for DTCs
(Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher, 1992; Bagchi et al., 1995; Tanzi and
Pellechio, 1995; Silvani and Baer, 1997) has largely emphasized the new
paradigm of the role of tax administration, as a facilitator and a provider of
services to taxpayer-citizens. Some recent administrative reforms around the
world have also embraced this new paradigm with great success. One of the
best examples is provided by Singapore's tax administration reform over the
last decade (Bird and Oldman, 2000). The main tenet of Singapore's reform
is service-oriented: the conversion from a hard-copy filing system to a
paperless imaging system, the extensive use of electronic filing, a one-stop
service to answer inquiries about any type of tax, the ability for filers to see
the entire tax form with any corrections before it is submitted, the use of
interest-free installment plans for paying taxes with direct deduction from
bank accounts, separate functional areas within the tax administration with
little opportunity for corruption, and a changed attitude of officials toward
taxpayers.
During the last decade, the tax administration service of
Singapore went from being the lowest rated government agency in public
satisfaction to one that 90 percent of the taxpayers found to provide
courteous, competent and convenient services. Of course, most countries,
especially those among DTCs, will not be able to imitate Singapore's reforms
frilly. Nevertheless, there is much to be gained in improved tax compliance
in DTCs by reforming their tax administrations along the lines of the new
paradigm.18
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TAX COMPLIANCE IN PRACTICE: SOME COUNTRY
CASE STUDIES
We have argued that the standard economic model of evasion offers some
important insights into tax evasion, but that it also suffers from some
significant limitations because of its failure to incorporate realistically the
role of societal institutions such as the 'social norm' of compliance and the
presence of an effective tax administration. These institutional factors are
especially critical to understand tax compliance issues in DTCs. In this
section we employ three country case studies to illustrate the importance of
such institutions in DTCs. The Jamaica case study demonstrates the
important but limited role in developing countries of basic enforcement
strategies based only upon higher audit probability and penalty rates. The
Africa case study demonstrates the crucial role of social norms in compliance
decisions. The Russia case study demonstrates the limited effectiveness of
isolated administrative innovations like tax amnesties in a setting that lacks
both an effective tax administration and an accepted social norm of tax
compliance.
The Impact of Standard Enforcement Methods: The Case of Jamaica
In 1983 the Government of Jamaica instituted a comprehensive reform of the
Jamaican tax system, including the individual income tax.'9 At that time,
income tax collections accounted for 28.9 percent of total government
revenues and 7.6 percent of national income. Over 90 percent of these
revenues were collected from employers withholding taxes on employee
wages, under a Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) system. The remaining 10 percent
of revenues came from individuals who were required to file a return upon
which taxes on other sources of income were paid, or so-called 'selfemployed' taxpayers. Although there have been significant changes in the
tax system since that time, the individual income tax remains a major part of
the Jamaican system.
In theory, the Jamaican income tax prior to reform was broad-based, with
a high and steeply progressive rate structure that rose from a marginal tax rate
of 30 percent on the first $J7 000 of taxable (or statutory) income to 57.5
percent on all income above $J 14 000.:o In practice, the base of the income
tax was substantially reduced by a variety of legal and illegal methods.
Taxpayers could receive up to 16 credits for purposes such as participation in
savings and insurance programs, employment of household helpers, and
personal and family credits. A more substantial narrowing of the base was
due to the provision to employees of non-taxable 'allowances' (or fringe
benefits), as well as to the preferential treatment of income earned from
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overtime activities; such overtime income was taxed at the lowest marginal
tax rate of 30 percent, even if the individual's total income placed him or her
in a higher marginal tax bracket. The tax base was also narrowed by tax
evasion via under-reporting of taxable income, overclaiming of tax credits,
and non-filing of individual income tax returns.
Five separate payroll taxes, payable by both workers and firms, were also
imposed on approximately the same base as the individual income tax. Of
these five programs, three provided benefits to individuals (for example,
disability and old-age benefits, housing subsidies, government employee
pensions) that were related to their contributions. The combined employee
and employer marginal tax rate in each program was constant, varying from 2
to 5 percent. In total, these payroll taxes were quite large, roughly half of the
revenues from the income tax, and they imposed a significant, additional
burden on taxpayers.
As part of the tax reform, individuals working with, and with the full
cooperation of, the Revenue Board of the Government of Jamaica, collected
several types of information that allowed a detailed examination of the
individual income tax (as well as of the payroll taxes). One data set focused
upon the responsiveness of PA YE employees to fiscal incentives (for
example, the marginal income and payroll tax rate, the audit rate, the penalty
rate, and the benefit rate of the payroll program) in their choice of taxable
reported income, of legally non-taxable allowances, and of illegally
underreported income (Aim, Bahl and Murray, 1990). Another combination
of data sets examined self-employed taxpayers, and allowed estimation of the
criteria by which self-employed income tax returns were selected for audit
and the responses of these taxpayers to fiscal incentives (Aim, Bahl and
Murray, 1993). Still another data set examined the prevalence of non-filing
of tax returns (Aim, Bahl and Murray, 1991). Here we focus on the PAYE
results.
During the initial stages of the tax reform in 1984, the Revenue Board
requested that all Jamaican firms in the PAYE sector provide information on
compensation for each employee. By January 1985, 1345 firms had reported
information for 69 724 workers, or 25 percent of the PAYE labor force. The
intent of this 'PAYE Survey' was to gather information on the extent of
employer provision of untaxed forms of compensation. Each firm gave
information for each of its employees on taxable cash compensation and non
taxable in-kind information; firms
also provided information on taxes
withheld and total tax credits. It was initially believed that the PAYE Survey
provided estimates only of reported taxable income and non-taxable
allowances. However, detailed examination of these data revealed numerous
instances in which there were serious discrepancies between taxes actually
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withheld and the statutory tax liability implied by tax credits and taxable
income. In nearly all circumstances, the discrepancies were shortfalls.
Various possible explanations for the discrepancies were explored:
random mistakes by the employer or the Jamaican Income Tax Department,
preferential taxation of legitimate overtime income, and correct tax liabilities
of individuals with large but unreported business-related expenses. In all
cases, these explanations were rejected. Instead, the most convincing
explanation for the discrepancies was that they were due to intentional efforts
to defraud the tax authority via tax evasion. Employees clearly had an
incentive to get their employer to underwithhold, and employers had an
incentive to accede to such employee requests.
For a given total
compensation cost to the firm,
the employer can provide greater net
compensation to the worker. The employer faced virtually no risk in this
practice because by law it is the employee who would be prosecuted if
detected.
Cash compensation in the PAYE Survey therefore was likely to consist of
reported taxable income and evasion compensation. Together with PAYE
Survey information on non-taxable allowances, the Survey allowed
estimation of the determinants of worker choice between reported income,
evasion income and allowance income.
These estimation results are
discussed in detail by Aim, Bahl and Murray (1990).
The dependent variables in this estimation were the shares of total
compensation allocated to reported, evasion and allowance income. The
explanatory variables consisted of various measures of firm
size and
indicators of firm
sector.
Importantly, the PAYE Survey allowed
construction of a number of variables that influenced the 'price' of the
different income types for each taxpayer, or the amount of gross
compensation that must be chosen to receive one dollar of net compensation:
the marginal income tax rate on reported income, the marginal penalty rate on
evasion income, the marginal payroll tax rate on cash compensation, the
marginal payroll tax benefit rate, and the (predicted) probability of detection.
These various components were combined into a price for each type of
income, and these prices were included as explanatory variables in each share
equation.21 The equations were estimated by Tobit maximum likelihood
estimation, and the estimation results are^summarized in Table 7.1.
As shown in Table 7.1 the own-price effects are generally significant and
of the expected (negative) sign, while the cross-price effects are symmetric
and generally significant; that is, individuals respond predictably to changes
in the tax, penalty, audit and benefit rates. Taken in their entirety, the
estimated price coefficients suggest a complicated behavioral response to the
various policy instruments. For example, an increase in the probability of
detection will generate a negative own-price effect on the tax evasion share.
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However, the cross-price effect on reported compensation will also be
negative, thereby reducing the tax base, and the cross-price effect on
allowance income will be positive.
Importantly, however, the estimated tax base elasticities are quite small.
The largest reported income elasticity is to a change in the marginal income
tax rate (-0.19). The other reported income elasticities are even smaller. The
penalty elasticity is -0.08, the payroll elasticity is 0.07, and the probability
elasticity is only -0.01.22
Overall, the PAYE results suggest that the enforcement regime in Jamaica,
and perhaps in most developing and transition countries, is not a major
deterrent to tax evasion. Relatedly, the results also suggest that very large
discretionary changes in the policy variables are required to induce a
significant change in taxpayer behavior; that is, even significant
administrative reforms in enforcement of the tax laws are of limited use in
affecting compliance decisions. Consequently, policies based upon the
traditional punishment paradigm can affect compliance but only to a limited
degree.
The Role of Social Norms: The Case of Southern Africa
Reducing tax evasion is not only a matter of applying higher penalties or
increasing the frequency of audits. To develop policies for the reduction of
tax evasion, it is essential to understand the behavioral aspects of the tax
compliance decision. If individual attitudes toward tax compliance are a
function of social norms, tax enforcement policies may have to be designed
specifically for the culture in which they will be applied. However, the
effects of social norms on tax compliance are not well understood, and it
seems unlikely that analyses based upon theory or field data will be of much
use here. In part because of the limitations of theoretical and empirical
approaches, economists have turned increasingly to the use of experimental
methods in the analysis of tax compliance.
Experimental methods are particularly useful for the study of some aspects
of the compliance decision. Unlike theoretical work, experiments are not as
constrained by the same degree of simplification required in analytical
studies. Unlike empirical work, experiments generate data under different
settings in which there is control over extraneous influences; that is, the
experimenter can hold the tax reporting institution constant (including the
enforcement effort, the tax rate and the income levels), in order to investigate
compliance behavior across various cultural settings. The experimental
approach is therefore ideally suited to investigate the question of whether
different social norms, as they arise from different societal institutions across
countries, have a significant impact on tax compliance behavior. This section
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reports on the results of the laboratory experiments on tax compliance
behavior conducted by Cummings et at. (2001) in South Africa, Botswana
and the United States, experiments designed to examine the role of social
norms in compliance decisions.
These experimental results provide support for the hypothesis that tax
compliance increases with individual perceptions that the tax system is fair
and that the government is providing valued goods and services with the
revenues. In all of the cultural settings investigated, compliance increases
with enforcement effort, but this is a less effective mechanism where the tax
regime is viewed as unfair. Therefore these results provide support for a
model of tax compliance behavior that extends well beyond the typical
economics-of-crime approach with its exclusive emphasis on deterrence. Put
differently, the experimental results support the view that tax enforcement
should focus more on how taxpayers assess government services and less on
how governments impose punitive measures.
In order to understand the differences in social norms in Botswana, South
Africa and the USA, it is necessary to understand the role of societal
institutions, including tax administration and citizen attitudes toward
government, in the three countries. Consider first tax administration. The
self-assessment and audit processes are broadly similar across the three
countries.
However, there are varying degrees of aggressiveness in
enforcement, and the level of development and sophistication of the tax
enforcement apparatus also differ across the three countries. The USA has
one of the most advanced tax administration systems in the world in its
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Botswana's tax administration system is still
developing, and the situation in South Africa is somewhat between these
poles. USA tax administration depends heavily on self-assessment and
reporting of tax liabilities, along with an extensive tax withholding system.
The audit process is generally regarded with dread on the part of the taxpayer,
and there is a great deal of uncertainty, fostered by the IRS, surrounding the
audit selection process and the determination of penalties. This strategy has
been effective but not without cost. A considerable portion of the public
backlash against the IRS has been due to the perception that the IRS is
capricious in its enforcement precisely because the rules and penalties are not
stated explicitly. South Africa also relies heavily on self-reporting and a
system of withholding, and treats tax evasion as a serious crime. The South
African tax authority, like its USA counterpart, exploits high profile cases to
reinforce its reputation for tough enforcement. In Botswana, on the other
hand, the attitude of the tax authority seems to be more accommodating.
Botswana also has lower marginal tax rates, with the personal income tax
capped at 25 percent, which is lower than the top rates in South Africa (45
percent) and the USA (39.6 percent).
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There are also differences in the public perception of government, the
equity of the tax system, and the penalties imposed for evasion. In the USA
there is a tradition of democratic decision-making, so that there is on the part
of many a certain trust for government. However, the IRS is often viewed as
invasive, and the tax auditing system is sometimes seen as unfair and
capricious (Yankelovich et al., 1984). Actions of the IRS often gamer a great
deal of negative publicity, such as that arising from its recent decision to
audit those claiming the earned income tax credit.
Botswana is virtually unique among African countries. Although it only
gained independence in 1966, diamond-rich Botswana is one of Africa's
oldest multiparty democracies, and it has successfully made the transition to
self-governance. Several elections have been held since independence, and
all have been quiet affairs with none of the violence or corruption that has
accompanied elections in neighboring countries. In fact, the government of
Botswana takes great pride in its stability, and refers to itself as the 'gem of
Africa' in many official publications. The message here is clear: the
government is working and working for you, and paying taxes is part of this
social contract.
The Botswana experience is in marked contrast with South Africa with its
well-known history of apartheid. Indeed, the recent elections in South Africa
have been controversial and often accompanied by violence, and both the
white and black populations are for different reasons suspicious of the
government. Crime rates are among the highest in the world, there is a
widespread perception that the government is corrupt, and there is a feeling
that the social order is somewhat fragile.
In this context, the notion of a
social norm to pay taxes is very weak.
In sum, while the United States scores highest in government openness
and equality, the tax system and the perception of the public sector in
Botswana seem to be rated the highest. South Africa is rated lowest on all
counts.
The laboratory experiments replicate most of the elements of the basic
structure of the personal income tax system in the three countries. Human
subjects in a controlled laboratory are told that they should feel free to make
as much income as possible. At the beginning of each round of the
experiment, individuals receive income, and they must decide how much
income to report. They pay taxes on income voluntarily reported. They do
not pay taxes on unreported income. However, they face a probability of
audit, and, if they are detected evading, they pay a penalty on taxes not
reported.21 This process is repeated for a given number of rounds, and at the
end of the experiment each subject is paid an amount that depends upon his
or her performance during the experiment.24 The experiments are fully
computerized, and the subjects interact with a simplified tax form on the
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computer screen. Because the experimental setting controls for the tax rate,
the probability of detection and the penalty rate, and because all subject pools
are subjected to identical parameters in the three countries, the observed
differences in tax compliance behavior are interpreted as motivated by
differences in those institutional features that may affect attitudes toward the
government (and by other possible factors that may capture differences in the
social norms across the countries).
Cummings et at. (2001) test two basic hypotheses. The first is that
compliance levels increase as the audit probability increases and as the
penalty rate increases.
The second, and main, hypothesis focuses on
differences in compliance behavior due to differences in social norms. Based
upon the differential levels of development of societal institutions in the three
countries, the second hypothesis states that compliance rates from the
experiments will be higher in Botswana and the USA than in South Africa
and also higher in Botswana than in the USA.
Cummings et al. (2001) report Tobit maximum likelihood estimation
results in which the individual compliance rate is estimated as a function of
various explanatory variables including dummy variables for the country in
which the experiments are performed. The basic specification introduced
dummy variables for subject pools from Botswana and the USA with the
control group being South Africa. Their estimation results generally
supported the argument of a significant effect of social norms on compliance
behavior. Compliance was higher in Botswana and in the USA than in South
Africa, with the only exception of the USA private university pool. The
compliance rate was also generally higher in Botswana than in the USA. It is
important to remember that risk attitudes cannot explain compliance
differences because all subject pools generally exhibited the same attitudes
toward risk in a simple gamble experiment that was context-free. In
summary, the experimental results suggested that the observed differences in
compliance behavior are closely related to societal institutions, including the
perception of government behavior by taxpayers and the effectiveness of tax
administration.25
The Effects of Tax Amnesties: The Case of the Russian Federation
During its entire transition period, the Russian Federation has suffered from
lagging tax collections and widespread tax evasion. The Russian tax
authorities have attempted to reform the tax system, but have only partially
succeeded.
As part of its overall fiscal program, the Russian Federation has enacted a
number of tax amnesties. This practice in Russia follows the practice in
many countries around the world, of introducing one or more amnesties. An
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amnesty typically allows individuals or firms to pay delinquent taxes without
being subject to some or all of the financial and criminal penalties that the
discovery of tax evasion normally brings.
Tax amnesties are a controversial revenue-raising tool. Advocates of
amnesties emphasize the immediate and short-run revenue impact, as
individuals take advantage of the grace period to pay unpaid taxes.
Advocates also argue that future tax compliance (and therefore future tax
revenues) may increase if the amnesty induces individuals not on the tax rolls
to participate, and if the amnesty is accompanied by more extensive taxpayer
services, better education on taxpayer responsibilities, and, especially, stricter
post-amnesty penalties for evaders and greater expenditures for enforcement.
Critics contend that the actual experiences of many countries indicate that the
immediate impact on revenues is almost always quite small. They also
question the long-run impact of a tax amnesty. If honest taxpayers resent the
special treatment of tax evaders, then their compliance may decline. Further,
if individuals come to believe that the amnesty is not a one-time opportunity,
then they may reduce their current compliance in anticipation of another,
future amnesty.26
Many of these issues have been examined, especially for state
governments in the United States. The experiences there, as well as those in
many other countries, suggest that amnesties are unlikely to be any kind of
fiscal panacea, but are also unlikely to be any kind of fiscal poison. In
particular, the available evidence indicates that a tax amnesty typically
generates only a small amount of additional tax revenue; multiple amnesties
are even less successful in generating additional revenues, and they have mild
but perverse effects on voluntary compliance as taxpayers incorporate the
expectation that future grace periods will occur. Importantly, successful
amnesties are accompanied by administrative changes that substantially
increase post-amnesty enforcement. An amnesty that is followed by an
enhanced enforcement regime and improved taxpayer education generally
increases, or at least does not decrease, voluntary tax compliance. In fact, if
increased enforcement activities and improved organization of the tax
administration are already planned by the tax authorities, then a tax amnesty
may be an effective tool for easing the transition to a new, tougher tax
regime. Such an amnesty offers several advantages: the amnesty generates
some immediate tax revenue, individuals with past evasion are not locked
into continued evasion, and the government both clears its ledgers of
accounts receivables and adds the names of past evaders to its records. It is
essential, however, that individuals believe that improved enforcement will
occur: the government must have credibility.
These experiences suggest that the multiple Russian amnesties would be
irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst. Here we discuss some
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evidence from Aim et al. (2001) on the effects of the multiple tax amnesties
enacted in the Russian Federation since 1993 on tax collections.
The first amnesty was introduced on 27 October, 1993 as Presidential
Decree No. 1773. This decree established an amnesty from 27 October to 30
November, 1993, and stipulated that all enterprises, organizations, and
private entrepreneurs who disclosed their unpaid taxes and tax payments for
1993 and all proceeding years would not be liable for any sanctions on these
unpaid liabilities. The Decree also specified that any concealed incomes
discovered after 30 November would be penalized by the State Tax Service
(STS) at three times the unpaid tax liability.27 As part of the amnesty, banks
were required to provide the STS with account information. However, the
design of the amnesty was flawed by the short period within which a taxpayer
was allowed to disclose unpaid tax obligations, by the requirement that the
liability be repaid within one month, and by a failure to allow for inadvertent
or unintended mistakes. The 1993 amnesty was repealed by Presidential
Decree 746 on 21 July, 1995.
The next amnesty was introduced by Presidential Decree No. 65 on 19
January, 1996 (with amendments on 22 April, 1996). Under this Decree,
enterprises and organizations with tax arrears were allowed to defer payments
on the arrears, provided that all current payments were made in time and in
full. Enterprises and organizations that were granted deferments were
required to pay 50 percent of the total amount due by October 1998, with
payment made via quarterly payments of 5 percent of the liability; interest
penalties were imposed at an annual rate of 30 percent on unpaid amounts.
This Decree was widely seen by taxpayers as too burdensome. In any event,
this amnesty was continued in somewhat modified form by Presidential
Decree No. 685 on 8 May, 1996. Provisions of the new Decree that were
immediately effective included such things as reduced interest penalties on
late payments and on tax arrears and an allowance for 'technical errors' (or
simple arithmetic mistakes) in the preparation of tax returns, all of which
were intended to reduce the burden of tax payment and which appeared to
introduce a true tax amnesty.
Presidential Decree No. 65 was followed roughly a year later by Budget
Law 29-FZ of 26 February, 1997, which established guidelines for newly
granted deferments on taxes and other mandatory payments. Importantly, the
Law asked that the government specify the procedures by which tax arrears
were to be handled. These procedures emerged in Budget Law No. 42-FZ of
26 March, 1998, and amounted to a substantial reduction in penalties on
arrears.
In total, given the poor quality of tax administration in the Russian
Federation, these various amnesties and related provisions were seen by tax
officials as an easy and attractive way of dealing with delinquent tax
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liabilities, especially those of mounting tax arrears. However, the almost
yearly enactment of some form of amnesty contributed to the widespread
belief that amnesties would be a regular event. As suggested by international
experience, a further drawback of the many amnesties was that they were not
accompanied by substantive tax reform in the Russian Federation, at least
until very recently (Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace, 1999). The effects of the
amnesties on tax collections therefore emerged as a matter of some concern.
These amnesties must be seen in the context of the overall Russian tax
system. This tax system is a complex system of federal, state and local taxes,
and the system has undergone change each year since 1992 (MartinezVazquez and Wallace, 1999; forthcoming). In the early years, new taxes
were introduced, most notably the value-added tax (VAT); in more recent
years, detailed changes have regularly been made to the major taxes. The tax
system is similar to that of developed countries in its reliance on the VAT,
excise taxes and income taxes. However, the system lacks the sophisticated
tax administration required to uphold the tax system. Moreover, the lack of
comprehensive tax policy development has resulted in a system that imposes
a myriad of taxes on businesses and individuals, thereby complicating
compliance and lowering taxpayer confidence in the system. The resulting
system is complex, and the multiple layers of taxes result in heavy statutory
burdens on labor and capital income.
Overall, revenues as a percentage of GDP fell from about 30 percent in
1992 to around 21 percent in 1999 (Table 7.2).28 This level of tax revenues is
not low by some international standards, and lies in the range of 'uppermiddle income countries' and above that of 'lower-middle income countries'
(USGTA, 1999). Russia's tax effort is also quite similar to that found in the
Baltic States. A comparison of similar statistics for total consolidated
government tax revenues relative to GDP also demonstrates that Russia is
close to the middle of the pack; Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Canada have higher ratios, but the United States, South Africa and Argentina
have lower ratios.
However, the trend of tax revenues relative to GDP is more troubling.
This ratio fell from 1992 to 1999, and it is likely that it has continued to fall
relative to the lower-middle and upper-middle income peer groups. It is clear
that Russia is not generating the level of revenues that it should be producing,
given the sophisticated statutory structure of the tax system and the high tax
rates on certain types of income. This failure is due to problems with
compliance and general administration of the tax system.
The tax system in the Russian Federation is haunted by many
characteristics of the Soviet system. Under the previous regime, taxes
completely lacked transparency. Often, enterprises did not know what other
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Table 7. 2 The case of the Russian Federation: tax receipts as a
percentage of GDP (consolidated budget)

Year

Consolidated tax
receipts (reported),
as a percentage of
GDP

Consolidated tax receipts
(adjusted for consistency
over time), as a percentage
of GDP

Deficits
(reported), as a
percentage of
GDP
18.90

1992

29.60

26.40

1993

28.91

23.68

7.30

1994

29.04

23.90

10.40

1995

22.68

22.68

6.00

19%

22.04

22.04

8.60

1997

22.70

22.70

7.60

1998

20.27

20.27

8.00

1999

21.39

21.39

1.90 (estimate)

-

1.00 (projected)

2000

Sources: Ministry of Finance and GSU/USAID Fiscal Reform Project. Prior to 1995,
budget receipts were not classified according to tax and non-tax receipts.

taxpayers in similar circumstances paid in taxes, and the population at large
was neither aware of taxes nor had any perceptions of tax burdens. Very few
individuals actually filed tax returns, paid taxes during transactions, or were
aware of the existence of turnover taxes or profit taxes. This tax system
created a taxpayer culture of mistrust of government and of non-compliance
that endures today. Taxpayers tend to believe that tax burdens are distributed
arbitrarily and that the government is wasteful if not corrupt. Many taxpayers
continue to refuse to pay taxes through non-filing of returns and under
reporting of income. Also, negotiated taxes were the main feature of the tax
system in the Soviet Union, and, after the years of transition, Russia's tax
system still retains an important element of negotiation. This is most
apparent in how settlements are reached on the payment of tax arrears, which
are composed of delinquent payment of taxes and deferred payments as
agreed upon between the tax authorities and taxpayers. Tax arrears are a
pervasive fact in the Russian economy, and have had a significant impact on
the performance of the tax system.29 Tax arrears appeared early in the
transition, and, although their level has oscillated, their trend has been a
clearly increasing one. By the end of 1998 tax arrears to government stood at
R 503.1, or roughly 16 percent of GDP. By comparison, the combined tax
collections of the federal and sub-national governments for 1998 were R
544.1 billion (Ivanova and Wyplosz, 1999), so that existing arrears were
roughly equal to total tax collections. While tax collections at the federal and
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sub-national level increased by 149.3 percent between 1995 and 1998, in the
same period tax arrears increased by 584.8 percent.
There are multiple causes for the growth in arrears in the Russian
Federation (Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996; Alexeev, 1998; Ivanova and
Wyplosz, 1999). Importantly, a policy designed by the federal governments
to combat arrears seems to have made the problem worse: the use of periodic
tax amnesties. Each amnesty seems to have built up expectations that new
arrears would be at least partially forgiven in the future.
Aim et al. (2001) examine the revenue impact of these amnesties, using
monthly data on tax collections of the Russian Federation, for the period
January 1995 to December 1998. They focus on the enterprise profits tax
(EPT), the value added tax (VAT), excises from a number of specific
commodity taxes, and the total monthly revenues from these three taxes
combined; they also calculate the total monthly revenues from all revenue
sources, including the EPT, the VAT, and excises, plus separate taxes on
securities, on personal income, on property, on licenses, on land, and on
natural resources, as well as on the sum of total combined arrears and total
revenues.
Some initial indications of the likely effects of the amnesties on revenues
can be seen in Figure 7.1, which shows monthly total revenues from all taxes
plus the change in the stock of arrears. This Figure clearly shows that the
enactment of the amnesties in 1996 and 1997 had no discernible impact on
[~

Total revenue plus change in stock of arrears, real monthly collections

Month/year

Figure 7. I Total revenue plus change in stock of arrears, real monthly
collections
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the trends of collections in the Russian Federation. Other revenue
breakdowns that look separately (or in combination) at the EPT, the VAT,
and the excises similarly show no systematic effect of the amnesties.
Aim et al. (2001) estimate the impact of the amnesties on these various
measures of tax collections, by introducing several dummy variables to
represent the impacts of the two amnesties introduced over their sample
period.30 Their estimation results for each of the various taxes, as well as for
the totals, indicate that the impact of the 19% amnesty is negative but
insignificant, while the 1997 amnesty tends to have a positive but, again,
insignificant effect on revenues. These empirical results are consistent with
many other studies that find the effects of amnesties to be neither destructive
nor benign, and often insignificant (Aim and Beck, 1993).

CONCLUSIONS
Tax evasion is among the most vexing problems in DTCs. Our motivation
for this chapter has been to examine what we have learned from the analyses
of tax evasion and what we can apply from these lessons to the problem of
tax evasion in DTCs. Our general theme is simple and basic. Institutions
matter everywhere, but they are especially decisive in developing and
transition countries where their quality is generally lower than in developed
countries. Because of the crucial role of such institutions, improving tax
compliance in DTCs requires focusing primarily upon improving societal
institutions.
We examine first the standard economic model of the individual evasion
decision, based on the economic theory of crime. We argue that this basic
framework offers some important insights but that it also suffers from some
significant limitations, limitations that arise largely because of its failure to
incorporate fully or realistically the role of societal institutions in the
analytical framework. Put differently, much of the theoretical analyses that
economists have produced in the context of developed economies offer
limited help in understanding the problem of tax evasion in DTCs. The
standard analytical work generally implies that rational individuals should
pay far less in taxes than they actually do, and this model performs much
better at explaining the change in tax reporting in response to policy
innovations than at explaining the level of tax reporting.
Second, we examine the role of some specific societal institutions in
explaining tax compliance behavior. One institution is the social norm of
compliance. A social norm represents a pattern of behavior that is judged in
a similar way by others and that therefore is sustained in part by social
approval or disapproval. The existence of social norms suggests that
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individuals will comply as long as they believe compliance is the social
norm; conversely, if non-compliance becomes pervasive, then the social
norm of compliance disappears. To the extent that government policies can
affect the social norm of compliance, this provides government with
additional means to combat tax evasion. Such government policies include
those that work through government institutions (for example, citizen
participation and popular support for government programs) and those that
reflect the government's explicit commitment to enforcing the tax laws.
However, these issues are not fully understood. The investigation of the
impact of social norms on compliance behavior is a promising avenue of
research for understanding tax evasion in DTCs. There is also a need to
improve our understanding of how compliance norms are influenced by
government policies, such as the responsiveness of government to its
citizens' needs, improved governance, and delivering value for money to
taxpayer-citizens.
Another societal institution that affects tax compliance is the
administrative machinery of the government tax agency. However, we argue
that the traditional 'punishment paradigm' for tax administration, which treats
taxpayers as potential criminals and puts exclusive emphasis on repression of
illegal behavior, will be only partially effective, especially in DTCs. The
newer 'service paradigm' recognizes the role of enforcement but also
emphasizes the role of tax administration as a facilitator and a provider of
services to taxpayer-citizens. This alternative paradigm is likely to be much
more effective in improving the compliance norm in society, in part because
it complements the role of social norms in tax compliance; that is, a service
paradigm may well enhance the social norm of compliance.
Third, we illustrate the importance of societal institutions for controlling
tax evasion in DTCs by three case studies. The experience of Jamaica
demonstrates the significant but limited role in DTCs of enforcement
strategies exclusively based on higher audit probabilities and penalty rates.
The results from Southern Africa strongly support the role of social norms in
compliance decisions. The Russian case demonstrates the limited impact of
administrative innovations like tax amnesties in a country that lacks both an
effective tax administration and a social norm of compliance.
In sum, we believe that societal institutions, such as the social norm of
compliance and the presence of an effective tax administration, are critical in
order to understand tax compliance issues in DTCs.
From a policy
viewpoint, it would appear that it may be equally important for DTCs to
strengthen the social norms of compliance as to improve and modernize a
service-oriented tax administration.
In this regard, recent work by Gould (1°96) emphasizes that it is grossly
misleading to represent a complex system by a single, so-called
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representative agent, who behaves in some average or typical way. Instead,
most systems have incredible variety - or a 'full house' of individual
behaviors - and the proper understanding of any system requires recognition
of this basic fact. Indeed, Gould (1996) argues that the way in which a
system changes over time is attributable largely to changes in the amount of
variation within the system, rather than to changes in some largely
meaningless 'average' behavior across its individual members.
This lesson is especially apt for tax compliance. People exhibit a
remarkable diversity in their behavior. There are individuals who always
cheat and those who always comply, some who behave as if they maximize
the expected utility of the tax evasion gamble, others who seem to overweight
low probabilities, individuals who respond in different ways to changes in
their tax burden, some who are at times cooperative and at other times freeriders, and many who seem to be guided by such things as social norms,
moral sentiments and tax equity. Any government approach toward tax
compliance must address this 'full house' of behaviors in devising policies to
ensure compliance. Consequently, a government compliance strategy based
only on detection and punishment may well be a reasonable starting point for
tax administration but not a good ending point. Instead, what is needed is a
multi-faceted approach that emphasizes enforcement, but that also
emphasizes the much broader range of actual motivations that explain why
people pay taxes. As we argue here, social norms can go a long way in
explaining the puzzle of tax compliance, and effectively addressing tax
evasion in DTCs will require better information on how these norms develop
and evolve.
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Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. Please address all
correspondence to James Aim, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy
Studies, Georgia State University, University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30303-3083 (Phone 404
651-0420; Fax 404 651-4985; email jalmr4gsu.edu) We are grateful to Milka Casanegra
de Jantscher, Richard Bird, and other conference participants for helpful comments and
discussions.
A major difficulty in analysing evasion is its measurement. See Tanzi (1980) and
Schneider and Enste (2000) for discussions and applications of various approaches to
measurement, all of which are subject to much imprecision and controversy.
See Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher (1992) for a discussion of developing countries and
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2000) for transitional countries.
See Cowell (1990), Andreoni el al. (1998), and Aim (2000) for comprehensive reviews of
the compliance literature.
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The first- and second-order conditions are, respectively:

cE U(I) /cD = pt (f-l) V dc) - (l-p)t U'(In) = 0
dE U(I/ / dD1 = p [ t (f-l) f U" (Ic) + (1-P)t1 U"(ln) < 0,
5.

6.

where each prime denotes a derivative.
Note that the probability of detection is assumed here to be fixed and random, so that the
audit agency is not allowed to use information from the taxpayers' returns in determining
whom to select for audit. It seems obvious that the tax agency can do better in identifying
tax evaders ifit uses this initial transmission of information from taxpayers than ifit simply
ignores the information and audits all taxpayers with equal frequency. Various audit
schemes that allow the tax agency to adjust its audit selection in light of information
provided by the taxpayer have been introduced and analysed. See, for example, Cronshaw
and Aim (1995).
For example, total differentiation of the first-order condition demonstrates that the impact
of a change in the probability of audit on declared income is given by:

dDldp = -/( (f-l) V (Id + t U' (Id ]/[pt2 (f-l)2 U"(lc) +

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

D-p)

t2 U" (IN)]

Given the second-order conditions (and the obvious requirement that f> 1), the sign of this
expression is unambiguously positive. Other comparative statics results are similarly
derived.
The two standard measures of risk aversion are 'absolute risk aversion' A(I), equal to U"(I)/U'(I), and "relative risk aversion" R(l), or -IU"(1)/U'(I). It is typically assumed that
A(I) decreases with income, while R(I) increases with income.
For example, it can be shown that a risk-neutral
individual will optimally choose to pay
taxes equal only to the expected value of the penalty on unreported income. See Aim
(2000) for further discussion.
For example, if the basic model is expanded by assuming that individuals can
simultaneously use two strategies to evade taxes (underreporting income and overstating
deductions), then it is no longer possible to predict that increased penalties or probabilities
of detection will reduce evasion. See Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (1995).
See Cowell (1990), Andreoni et al. (1998) and Aim (2000) for discussions of these many
studies. There has also been some work carried out to expand the basic model of individual
choice by introducing some aspects of behavior or motivation considered explicitly by
other social sciences, such as 'overweighting' of low probabilities, 'reference point' effects,
deviancy, personal and situational characteristics, social contexts and attribution theory.
See Smith and Kinsey (1987) and Webley et al. (1991) for discussions and evaluations of
many of these alternative theories.
This problem with expected utility theory — that it is unable to explain adequately the
behavior of many taxpayers — is not limited to its tax compliance incarnation. Such
anomalous behavior has frequently
been found in many other areas of choice under
uncertainty, particularly in those areas that involve low probability-high loss events (such
as natural disasters), or in those areas where the decisions of individuals are interdependent
and repeated (for example, voluntary public good provision). Machina (1987) documents
evidence showing that individuals do not typically behave in ways consistent with expected
utility theory.
This dilemma can be illustrated more precisely, using the standard model of the individual
compliance decision. Suppose that the utility function of the individual is f/fl-e), where
the subscript i refers to the state of the world (i=C,N) and e is a measure of the individual's
constant relative risk aversion. Using the definitions of Ic and IN, the expected utility
maximization can then be solved for the optimum amount of declared income D*. Now
suppose that D* is calculated for specific, realistic values of the various parameters. For
example, if (=0.4, f=2, p=0.02, and e=l, then the individual will optimally declare no
income. Very large values for relative risk aversion are required to generate compliance
consistent with actual country experience. When e=3, declared income is only 14 percent
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of true income; when e=5, it is still only 44 percent; when t = 10, it is 71 percent. Risk
aversion must exceed 30 for compliance to exceed 90 percent. However, existing field
evidence on the coefficient of relative risk aversion suggests that e ranges between 1 and 2.
Risk aversion must be abnormally large for behavior to be even roughly comparable to
actual observed choices, even in many developing and transition countries with low levels
of compliance.
There are other concepts that describe the same basic phenomenon as social norms, such as
'psychic cost' (Gordon, 1989), 'tax morale' (Pommerehne et al. 1994), 'moral sentiments'
(Erard and Feinstein, 1994), group conformity and social customs' (Myles and Naylor,
1996), and 'intrinsic motivation' (Frey 1997).
Some degree of tax evasion exists in every country. However, when does tax evasion
become the accepted norm? Practically, nothing is known about the 'critical mass' or the
'tipping point' of tax evasion, where the social norm of tax compliance switches to one of
tax evasion. This issue is discussed more fully later.
See, for example, Westat, Inc. (1980), Yankelovich et al. (1984), and Harris and
Associates, Inc. (1988) for the United States; Vogel (1974) for Sweden; Lewis (1979) for
the United Kingdom; and de Juan et al. (1994) for Spain.
See also Steenbergen et al. (1992) who model compliance intentions as being a function of
'general tax beliefs' about the fairness of the tax system and also various 'inhibitors' that
serve to alter the perception of the acceptability of tax evasion (for example, guilt, social
sanctions and legal sanctions).
Several of the economists who developed and extended the standard economic model of tax
evasion have also examined the issue of the optimal enforcement by the tax administration
agency (Sandmo, 1981; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1987; Usher, 1986; Kaplow, 1990; Slemrod,
1990). The important themes of this literature are two. First, tax administration and
taxpayer compliance costs need to be considered in designing an optimal enforcement
policy. Second, changes in tax collections stemming from changes in enforcement may be
a poor guide to the optimal level of enforcement because enforcement uses up real
resources in the economy while increased collections simply represent a transfer of
resources.
The rule for optimal tax enforcement should therefore equate the marginal
enforcement cost to the marginal increase in welfare caused by the decrease in excess
burdens and other costs (including 'anxiety costs') associated with tax evasion. However,
with the exception of additional resource cost spent on administration and the additional
revenues generated, all costs and benefits of increased tax enforcement are extremely
difficult to measure. In this sense, the policy impact of the optimal enforcement literature
has been limited for developed economies and especially limited for DTCs.
Note that the available evidence from government budgetary information indicates that the
budget cost of collecting individual income, business income and sales taxes is generally in
excess of I percent of the revenues from these taxes, and can sometimes be substantially
higher (Sandford, 1995). However, there is little information on how these costs vary with
various policy tools. It seems likely that administrative costs change in large and discrete
amounts with the scale of collections and that they may also display economics of scale in
their collections, but these aspects of the collection cost technology are not known.
See Bahl (1991) for a discussion of the entire tax reform project.
The exchange rate in 1983 between Jamaican and US dollars was US$ 1 =JS 1.93. At 1983
exchange rates, the 30 percent bracket applied to the first US$3627 of income, and the 57.5
percent bracket began at US$7254. Per capita Jamaican income in 1983 was US$1614.
For example, the price of reported income equals [l/(l-t-b)]t where t is the combined
income and payroll tax rate and b is the payroll benefit rate; that is, a worker must allocate
[l/(l-t-b)] in gross reported compensation in order to receive one dollar of net reported
income. Similarly, the price of allowance income is simply one because allowance income
is not taxed by the income or the payroll tax and it is not eligible for payroll benefits. The
price of evasion income depends upon whether the worker is audited or not. If the worker
is caught evading, then [l/(l-ft)] must be spend on gross compensation to receive one
dollar of net evasion income, where / is penalty rate on unpaid taxes; if the worker is not
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23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

caught, the price of evasion income is one. The expected price therefore equals (p[l/(lft)]+(l-p)), where p is the probability of detection.
Other empirical evidence from other countries is largely consistent with some of these
results. For example, estimation results from Dubin and Wilde (1988) suggest that a higher
audit rate leads to more compliance, with an estimated reported income-audit rate
elasticity ranging from 0.1 to 0.2. Sheffrin and Triest (1992) examine individual survey
data, and also find that compliance increases with a greater (perceived) probability of audit.
A maintained hypothesis during the experiments was that risk attitudes were the same in
the three countries. This was supported by a test of the willingness to bear risk for all
participating subjects in the three countries.
The experiments in the United States were conducted in three different locations: a
historical black university, a large state university, and a large private university.
See also Aim et al. (1995) for similar results on the role of social norms, comparing
Spanish and US subjects.
As stated by Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, an amnesty gives one 'bread for today, hunger
for tomorrow'.
The name of the State Tax Service was changed in 1999 to the Ministry of Taxation.
This figure excludes contributions to the social extra-budgetary ftinds, and tax collections
at the federal level do not include tax offsets.
With the exception of government wage arrears, no published data exist on government
budget arrears. Sundberg and Morozov (1999) report that the new budget arrears at the
federal level in 1998 were R 24.6 billion and were R 26.4 billion in 1997. At the subnational level, budget arrears were R 86.2 billion by February 1999. See also Alfandari and
Schaffer (1996).
Also included are a dummy variable equal to 1 for December collections and 0 otherwise
because the month of December in Russia has always been characterized by a strong
seasonal increase in collections (and a fall in arrears), and real Gross Domestic Product
because the level of economic activity is expected to affect collections of the various taxes.
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